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CHINA-EU BUSINESS RELATIONS: WORKING TOGETHER TO 
CREATE A WIN-WIN SITUATION 
H.E. Mr. WU Hailong  
 
 
In 2012, China and the European Union maintained the other as the most 
important trading partner, as evidenced by the strong interdependence and 
the complementary relationship. The EU remains China’s largest trading 
partner, the largest source of technology transfer, and the fourth largest 
source of foreign investment. China has become the EU’s largest source of 
imports, the second largest trading partner, and as second largest, China is 
among the fastest-growing export markets. According to Chinese statistics, 
from January to November 2012, bilateral trade in goods was registered at 
$495.7 billion. In the first ten months, real investment from the EU to China 
reached $5.2 billion, and nearly $6.9 billion worth of deals have been made 
to transfer technology from Europe to China. 
However, our current economic cooperation and trade is not problem-
free, and the European sovereign debt crisis has resulted in the decline of 
bilateral trade and investment between China and Europe. According to 
Chinese statistics, from January to November, bilateral trade in goods 
dropped by 4.1 percent year-on-year, and Chinese exports to Europe have 
fallen by 7 percent. In the first ten months, EU investment in China has also 
decreased by 5 percent. According to EU statistics, in the first eight months of 
2012, EU imports from China recorded zero growth. What is even worse is that 
since the beginning of the year, China has been increasingly challenged by 
the deteriorating environment of exports to the EU. There is a particular 
concern that due to the increasing number and size of trade frictions, 
protectionist sentiments are clearly on the rise. Since early 2012, the EU has 
launched seven trade remedy measures against Chinese companies. The 
antidumping and countervailing investigation into Chinese solar panels 
amounts to over $20 billion, accounting for 7.4 percent of total Chinese 
exports to Europe. 
Despite these challenges, both sides have continued to demonstrate a 
strong desire to cultivate the cooperation. During the 15th China-EU Summit in 
September 2012, leaders from both sides reached a broad agreement to 
recommit to the intensification of cooperation in matters of the economy, 
finance, energy, the environment, and urbanisation, injecting new vigour into 
China-EU cooperation across industries. Both sides have maintained sound 
cooperation on the protection of intellectual property rights with fruitful results 
achieved in the Intellectual Property Rights Dialogue and commitment made 
to carry out the IPR Phase III Project. Both sides have expressed a strong desire 
for the early launch of the negotiations for an investment agreement to 
facilitate two-way investment. Plans have also been made to leverage the 
High-Tech Trade Working Group to promote the China-EU trade balance 
                                                 
 H.E. Mr. WU Hailong is the Ambassador of People’s Republic of China to the European Union. 
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through enhancing high-tech trade and increasing relevant EU exports to 
China. 
During the recently concluded 18th Congress of the Communist Party 
of China (CPC), members of the Congress adopted an inspiring development 
blueprint for the country. China will continue to grow its domestic market, 
optimise an industrial mix, and promote new industries of strategic 
significance, advanced manufacturing business, and the service industry. 
Efforts will also be made to accelerate the upgrade and adjustment of 
traditional industries. During the 12th Five Year Plan, China aims to maintain 
an annual economic growth rate of 7 percent, which will help to increase the 
market size and will result in enormous consumption. It is estimated that the 
overall retail sales of social consumption products will increase by 15 percent 
per year, and total Chinese imports are expected to exceed $10 trillion. While 
the European brands have successfully established their names among the 
Chinese consumers, Chinese manufacturing companies have also been 
successful in bringing the high-quality and low-priced products to European 
customers. I strongly believe that Europe will continue to keep its edge when 
it comes to the advanced technologies, innovation capacity, and 
management expertise in strengthening its business cooperation with China. 
For China and Europe, the current situation of the world economy and 
the European sovereign debt crisis should be viewed as a rare historical 
opportunity for cooperation. Instead of wasting time and energy by 
intentionally playing up the differences and disputes, both partners should 
make the best of the opportunity and nurture bilateral economic 
cooperation and trade. It is imperative that all forms of protectionism be 
opposed, mutual market access expanded, and trade disputes resolved 
through a smooth consultation process. The EU’s recent antidumping and 
countervailing investigation into Chinese solar panel products has not only 
triggered a strong reaction within China, but has also caught the attention of 
the international community and caused concern among the business 
community in Europe. 
These developments pose great harm to the overall interests of the 
relevant industries and businesses in both China and Europe. Such actions by 
the EU will also inevitably undermine the image of the Union and shake 
Chinese companies’ confidence with regards to doing business in Europe, as 
it casts doubt on the EU’s capacity to properly handle trade frictions. For 
China, complementarity outweighs rivalry in China-EU business ties, and such 
complementarity has only been reinforced by the international financial crisis 
and constitutes a stable and durable basis for cooperation. In the future, 
China and the EU must uphold the spirit of cooperation in order to withstand 
the difficulties and remain committed to creating more opportunities for 
businesses to cooperate and to grow. I am full of confidence that by working 
together, both partners will be able boost market confidence, reinvigorate 
both economies, and set an outstanding example for the rest of the world of 
a strategic and mutually beneficial partnership.  
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CHALLENGES TO THE EU-CHINA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP 
Jing Men 
 
 
Ten years have passed since the EU and China established a strategic 
partnership in 2003. During these years, the two sides have set up three pillars 
of high-level exchanges: the High-Level Economic and Trade Dialogue (2008), 
the High-Level Strategic Dialogue (2010), and the High-Level People-to-
People Dialogue (2012). Moreover, more than 50 sectoral dialogues have 
been institutionalised and many of them have led to fruitful results, including, 
for example, the establishment of the EU-China Climate Change Partnership, 
the Mayors’ Forum, the EU-China Partnership for Urbanisation, and the High-
Level Meeting on Energy.  
Between the EU and China, economic and trade relations remain the 
cornerstone. The EU is China’s largest trading partner and China is the EU’s 
second largest trading partner. The total trade in goods grew from €101 billion 
in 20001 to €428.3 billion in 2011.2 The EU is China’s top source of technology 
imports, while China is the EU’s biggest source of imports as well as the fastest-
growing export market. The economic interdependence has been 
significantly strengthened during these years.  
Yet, despite all these achievements, the EU-China strategic partnership 
faces serious challenges. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao offered a definition of 
the strategic partnership in 2004: “By ‘strategic’, it means that the 
cooperation should be long-term and stable, bearing on the larger picture of 
China-EU relations. It transcends the differences in ideology and social system 
and is not subjected to the impacts of individual events that occur from time 
to time”.3 A review of the decade’s bilateral ties only indicates that the EU 
and China failed to transcend their differences in ideology and social systems 
and that their relations have been troubled by a number of issues. From 
institutional arrangement to norms, from economic relations to climate 
change, this paper analyses the challenges in EU-China relations and poses 
some questions to the European and Chinese leaderships. 
The institutional challenge 
The EU-China annual summit mechanism was established in 1998. As the 
highest institutional arrangement between Brussels and Beijing, always held in 
the last quarter of each year, it summarises the year’s achievements in 
                                                 
 Prof. Dr. Jing Men is the InBev-Baillet Latour Chair of EU-China Relations at the College of 
Europe, Bruges. 
1 European Parliament, EU-China Trade Relations, 2011, p. 7. 
2 European Commission, “Facts and figures on EU-China trade”, September 2012, retrieved 1 
December 2012, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/september/tradoc_144591.pdf. 
3 Wen Jiabao, “Vigorously Promoting Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between China and 
the European Union”, May 2004, retrieved 1 December 2012, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cebe/eng/xnyfgk/t101949.htm. 
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bilateral relations and sets the tone for further development. Such an 
important mechanism should have been strictly observed.  
Yet, among the 15 EU-China summits held during these years, two were 
not convened as scheduled. The Tibetan issue is regarded as belonging to 
domestic affairs, and maintaining territorial integrity as a key national interest 
by the Chinese leadership. Chinese leader Hu Jintao challenged the 
mechanism in late 2008 due to a planned meeting between Sarkozy and the 
Dalai Lama, mainly because Sarkozy was not only the French President, but 
also held the EU Presidency during the second half of 2008. The French 
decision led to the Chinese unilateral cancellation of the summit meeting. 
Interestingly enough, three years later, when the European Union was in the 
abyss of the Euro crisis, and when all the preparations for the 14th summit in 
Tianjin were made, President Van Rompuy called his counterpart in China 
several days before the scheduled summit and cancelled it, using the excuse 
of being fully occupied with the crisis. While it is known that the euro has been 
troubled since 2009, it is somehow difficult to convince people of the fact that 
the summit was cancelled simply because of the emergency arising from the 
European sovereign debt crisis. While it is unclear whether Brussels used the tit-
for-tat approach after China’s cancellation of the 2008 summit, it at least 
indicates that Brussels does not care about bilateral arrangements in face of 
challenges from inside. From the institutional perspective, while the situation in 
2008 was unprecedented and stunned the world, the summit cancellation in 
2011 by the Europeans did not trigger any fuss. However, if the highest-level 
meeting could be easily cancelled by either side, how much respect does 
each have for this meeting mechanism? In other words, how much 
importance is given to the EU-China strategic partnership by Brussels and 
Beijing? 
Similar problems exist in the institutional structure at all levels. The High-
Level Economic and Trade Dialogue, for example, launched in 2008, was held 
for three consecutive years until 2010. Although there are expectations on the 
EU-side to continue this dialogue with China, there has been no consensus 
between the two as to when to hold the 4th dialogue. During the Chinese 
leadership transition from the 4th to the 5th generation between 2012 and 
2013, China is fully occupied by its domestic political arrangements. It is said 
that all the important events on the EU-China 2013 calendar will not be 
settled until the 12th National People’s Congress is held in March.  
The normative/political challenge 
Despite the establishment of the EU-China strategic partnership, the 
normative/political gap between the two has not been narrowed during 
these years. China’s rapid rise in the 21st century has proved a significant 
change in the world. The reforms that have been taking place over thirty 
years have China the world’s 2nd largest economy.  The Europeans, on the 
one hand, are amazed by China’s economic achievements; on the other 
hand, are frustrated at the slow political progress in China, overshadowed by 
its economic reform. According to the Pew Research Centre, in 2012 62 
percent in Germany, 50 percent in Britain, 57 percent in France and 57 
percent in Spain name China as the world’s top economic power. Yet, in 
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France, China’s favourability ratings dropped from 51 percent in 2011 to 40 
percent in 2012 and in Britain from 59 percent to 49 percent. 4 
China has always been criticised by the EU for its various human rights 
problems. The contended issues, such as political dissidents and the death 
penalty, were raised once in a while, making trouble for bilateral relations. The 
Sakharov Prize in 2008 was given to the Chinese dissident Hu Jia by the 
European Parliament, which predictably provoked protests from Beijing. 
The EU’s arms embargo on China, put into place in 1989, continues to 
exist today. Although the Chinese urged the Europeans to lift it, and the issue 
was indeed seriously discussed in the EU between 2003 and 2005, no solution 
has been found. At his last EU-China summit before handing over power to 
the next generation, Chinese Premier Wen said in September 2012 in Brussels 
that "the solution has been elusive over the past 10 years. I deeply regret this."5  
The challenges in bilateral trade 
Behind the picture of an increasingly interdependent EU-China trade 
relationship and a rapidly rising two-way trade volume, is the EU’s annoyance 
with many issues in its economic and trade relations with China, including the 
big deficit in trade in goods, the state subsidies given to Chinese enterprises, 
the IPR issue, the less open Chinese market and lack of a level playing field. 
Bilateral trade relations have become tense in recent years. 
The EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht complained that China 
subsidises “nearly everything”, which distorts competition.6 In order to take 
action against Huawei Technologies Co Ltd and ZTE Corp – the world’s 
second- and fifth-largest makers of wireless telecoms gear – the Commission 
intended to launch an investigation on its own initiative in May, but decided 
to suspend the case just before the 15th EU-China summit. 
In early September 2012, the Commission launched an anti-dumping 
investigation over Chinese photovoltaic (PV) products after the German firm 
SolarWorld AG filed a complaint in July. According to Xinhua News Agency, 
this is the largest trade dispute involving China in terms of trade volume – the 
Chinese exports to the EU, valued at $20.4 billion, would come under fire.7 This 
move came after the US’s preliminary ruling, which is to “impose high anti-
dumping duties on PV cells and modules imported from China, ranging from 
31 percent to 249.96 percent in May 2012, and to impose anti-subsidy duties 
                                                 
4  “Global Opinion of Obama Slips, International Policies Faulted”, Pew Research Centre, 13 
June 2012, retrieved 7 December 2012, http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/06/13/global-opinion-
of-obama-slips-international-policies-faulted/. 
5  “China premier Wen Jiabao urges end to EU arms embargo”, BBC, 20 September 2012, 
retrieved 1 December 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-19657940. 
6 Philip Blenkinsop, “EU holds fire on ZTE, Huawei telecom trade case”, Reuters, 9 October 2012, 
retrieved 1 December 2012, 
http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSBRE89810V20121009?irpc=932. 
7 “EU launches anti-dumping probe into China”, Xinhua News Agency, 7 September, 2012, 
retrieved 1 December 2012,  http://www.china.org.cn/photos/2012-
09/07/content_26454576.htm. 
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ranging from 2.9 percent to 4.73 percent in March 2012.”8 If the EU took similar 
action after investigation, it would put the Chinese photovoltaic industry in a 
very difficult situation. 
The Chinese Ministry of Commerce launched an anti-dumping and 
anti-subsidy investigation on solar-grade polysilicon imported from the EU on 1 
November 2012. In the view of an analyst from Bloomberg New Energy 
Finance, “[t]he announcement is more a response to the EU probe and the 
result will be highly dependent [on the decision of the European Commission 
in its investigation against Chinese products].”9 If the tension continues to rise, 
it will directly affect the general direction of EU-China relations. In order to 
avoid any possibility of trade wars, the High-Level Economic and Trade 
Dialogue should be held as soon as possible – which will hopefully help both 
sides to address their concerns and find solutions.  
The EU aviation carbon tax 
In the field of climate change, tension has been growing recently between 
Beijing and Brussels partly due to the EU’s law on the aviation carbon tax. 
Since 1 January 2012, greenhouse gas emissions from aviation activities have 
been regulated by the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) and non-European 
airlines are requested to comply with the obligations imposed by the EU law. 
Together with other countries, China strongly opposes the EU law, but 
compared with other countries, it is one of the most adamant in confronting 
the EU. The European Commission estimates that the ETS will cost Chinese 
airlines less than €2.5 million per year,10 but according to the Chinese 
calculation, adopting the ETS standards will cost China’s aviation industry 
Rmb790 million ($124 million) in 2012 and an estimated Rmb3.7 billion in 2020.11 
On 6 February 2012, Beijing announced that its airlines may not 
participate in the ETS without authorisation from Chinese authority. About 
three months later, China published a draft climate change law, which 
mentioned possible “retaliatory approaches” to dealing with the EU’s 
inclusion of aviation within its ETS. Without specifying the EU, the draft law 
stated that “China objects to other countries and areas using climate change 
as an excuse to conduct protectionism in trade, or unilaterally levying carbon 
taxes or similar taxes on Chinese airlines, ships, etc.”12  
                                                 
8 Labwu Zengxian, “Domestic Demand Can Save Chinese PV”, 12 December 2012, retrieved 15 
December 2012, http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2012/12/the-last-
word-can-domestic-demand-save-chinese-pv. 
9 “China Probes EU Solar-Silicon Imports for Dumping, Subsidies”, Bloomberg News, 1 November 
2012, retrieved 15 December 2012, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-10-31/china-
probes-eu-solar-polysilicon-imports-for-dumping-subsidies. 
10 Erin Hale and Damian Carrington, “EU hails airline emissions tax success,” Guardian, 15 May 
2012, retrieved 15 September 2012,  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/may/15/eu-airline-emissions-tax-success. 
11 Dickon Harris, “A European gun to the head,” Airfinance network, 7 July 2012, retrieved 15 
September 2012, http://network.airfinancejournal.com/Post/A-European-gun-to-the-
head/6588/False. 
12 Point Carbon, “China’s draft Climate Change Law backs continuation of CDM projects,” 14 
May 2012, retrieved 15 September 2012, 
http://www.pointcarbon.com/aboutus/pressroom/pressreleases/1.1889835. 
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While all airlines from outside the EU oppose to be included in the EU’s 
ETS, they all, except for eight Chinese airlines and two Indian airlines, 
submitted the required baseline emissions data for 2011 before the end of 
March 2012, the deadline requested by the EU. Instead of introducing 
punitive measures immediately, the EU extended the deadlines to mid-June, 
but the Chinese ignored the offered extension.  
China’s reasons for challenging the EU law are mainly due to the 
following considerations. First, the EU is a regional organisation. It has no right 
to implement a law which includes players outside the Union. In other words, 
the unilateral action taken by the EU infringes upon the state sovereignty of 
those which are not member states of this organisation. Secondly, the EU 
made the policy without acquiring the opinions of other countries. As a rising 
power that pays increasing attention to its rightful place in the international 
arena, China feels upset at being put in the position of a rule-taker. In order to 
better protect both its political and economic interests, China would like to 
be a rule-maker. The conflict with the EU over the ETS is part of China’s 
struggle to gain influence reflecting its rising power in the world. Thirdly, due to 
this law, huge costs will be inflicted upon Chinese airlines, deemed 
unacceptable by China. Fourthly, and most importantly, behind the debate 
on whether international airlines should be involved in the EU’s ETS lies the 
core difference between the developed and the developing world on who 
should pay for the costs of mitigating climate change. Regarding itself as the 
representative of developing countries, China emphasises time and time 
again that the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” should 
be respected when considering efforts against climate change. 
Under pressure, the Commission decided to suspend the enforcement 
of its controversial aviation tax for one year. Yet this decision will only set aside 
the differences between the EU and China temporarily. As development 
remains the top priority for China, it is unlikely that China will allow other 
objectives to interfere with its economic growth. Economic performance is 
linked to employment and social stability, which are closely related to 
government legitimacy. Although ecological progress was included in the 
Communist Party Congress Report released in November 2012 for the first 
time, China’s basic policy on climate change will not be changed. 
Prospects for the coming decade 
There is a bottleneck in the development of the EU-China strategic 
partnership. There is a lack of trust and mutual understanding between the 
two sides. More importantly, some fundamental differences between the EU 
and China, including the differences between a bloc of liberal democratic 
states and an authoritarian state and between a developed group and a 
developing country, make it difficult for the two to always find converging 
interests in their relations. The question is: in face of often divergent positions in 
many fields, is there a feasible way to dismiss mistrust and enhance mutual 
understanding? At the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the EU-China 
strategic partnership, the year 2013 will be a good moment for the two sides 
to reflect upon the nature of their relations and ask themselves: how to add 
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more substance to their strategic partnership on the basis of all the 
established platforms of communication? 
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THE EU’S ROLE IN PROMOTING THE SOCIAL  
DIMENSION OF GLOBALIZATION IN CHINA  
Hang  Yuan 
 
 
Introduction  
Discussions of the social dimension of globalisation have been taking place all 
over the world for almost two decades.1 The European Union (EU) has been 
actively participating in this debate and developed a broad international 
social agenda to endorse the key initiatives advocated by the International 
Labour Organization (ILO), such as core labour standards (CLS), a decent 
work agenda, and corporate social responsibility (CSR).2 While the EU has also 
been promoting these initiatives in the context of EU-China relations for over a 
decade, the academic research in this field is far less bourgeoning.3 The few 
existing studies on the EU’s diffusion of international norms towards China 
concentrate on civil and political rights.4 As the social dimension of 
globalisation involves human rights, social cohesion and sustainable 
                                                 
 Hang Yuan is a PhD candidate at the Centre for EU Studies, Department of Political Sciences, 
Ghent University. He is also a Lecturer of International Relations at the School of Political 
Science and Assistant Researcher at the Centre for European Studies,  Sichuan University. 
1 The social dimension of globalisation refers to the impact of globalisation on the life and work 
of people, on their families, and the societies. The issues concerned include the impact on 
work, income, social protection, security, culture and identity, inclusion or exclusion as well as 
the cohesiveness of families and communities. The discussions on this topic at the global level 
were first stimulated by a series of meetings, including the 1995 World Summit for Social 
Development in Copenhagen and the 2000 World Summit in New York identifying the UN 
Millennium Goals. In 2004, the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization 
(WCSDG)’s Report called for global leadership to “build a fair and inclusive process of 
globalization”. See World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, A Fair 
Globalization: Creating opportunities for all, Geneva, International Labour Office, 2004; B. 
Gunter & R. Hoeven, “The Social Dimension of Globalization: A Review of the Literature”, 
International Labour Review, vol. 143 , No. 1-2, 2004, pp. 7-43.  
2 J. Orbie & L. Tortell, “Exporting the European Social Model: Broadening Ambitions, Increasing 
Coherence?”, in J. Orbie & L. Tortell (eds.), Symposium on ‘The European Union’s Global Social 
Role’, Journal of European Social Policy, vol.19, no. 2, 2009, pp.99-104. 
3 The social dimension of globalisation is much less discussed than the economic, political and 
security issues involved in EU-China relations. See, for example, F. Austermann, “The European 
Model of CSR and Labour Standards in China”, in J. Men & G. Balducci (eds.), Prospects and 
Challenges for EU-China Relations in the 21st Century: the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement, Brussels, Peter Lang Pub Inc., 2010, pp. 81-102. 
4 W. Shen, “Imperialistic Endeavour or Empty Rhetoric? Analysing the EU’s Promotion of Human 
Rights in China Since 1989 through a ‘Normative Power’ Perspective “, in J. Wetzel (ed.),  The EU 
as a ‘Global Player’ in Human Rights?,  Routledge, 2011; R. Balme, “The European Union, China 
and Human Rights”, in Z. Laïdi (ed.), EU Foreign Policy in A Globalized World: Normative Power 
and Social Preferences,  London, Routledge, 2008, pp. 143-173; G. Balducci, “The Limits of 
Normative Power Europe in Asia: the Case of Human Rights in China”, East Asia, vol. 27, 2010, 
pp.35–55; M. Mattlin, “Dead on Arrival: Normative EU Policy Towards China’, Asia Europe 
Journal, no.10, 2012, pp. 181-198. 
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development, the research on this topic has the potential to yield a more 
comprehensive understanding of the relations between the EU and China.  
        This paper aims to explore the EU’s role in promoting the social dimension 
of globalisation when engaging China. A popular analytical framework, 
developed by Ian Manners on the EU’s role in diffusing norms in the world, will 
be employed.5 This framework examines three related aspects of EU efforts: 
the principles, actions and impact of its external policies. Specifically, the 
application of this framework involves a tripartite analysis: whether the EU acts 
through “living by example” in principles, “being reasonable” in actions and 
“doing least harm” consequentially to China.6  
The norms promoted   
First of all, the EU actively promotes the CLS, which cover four fundamental 
rights.7 Connecting civil and political rights with social and economic ones, 
the CLS are in accordance with the well-established texts of international law 
and their objectives.8 Decent work is one of the UN Millennium Development 
Goals (MDG) and the decent work agenda is a policy instrument used to 
achieve the CLS.9 In addition, CSR involves initiatives encouraging 
companies’ voluntary efforts to improve the labour rights and benefits of their 
employees.        
       The EU’s lasting commitment to these initiatives is embodied and 
reaffirmed in its own legal and policy documents. The Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union in the Lisbon Treaty is the EU’s 
basic legal basis for the CLS.10 The EU policy papers also make explicit 
references to the abovementioned initiatives by the ILO.11  
                                                 
5 Ian Manners developed the approach of Normative Power Europe. Its central assumption is 
that the EU can be viewed as a normative power if it acts normatively when promoting norms. 
See I. Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, vol. 40, no. 2, 2002, pp. 234–58; I. Manners, “The Normative Ethics of the 
European Union”, International Affairs, vol. 84, no.1, 2008, pp. 45-60. 
6 Ibid. As a normative power, the EU is expected to act normatively in three ways: living in line 
with the norms it advocates; mainly using dialogue and persuasion in diffusing those norms; 
and avoiding harmful consequences in the diffusion.  
7 These rights are coded in 8 ILO Conventions: N°s 87 and 98 on freedom of association and the 
right to collective bargaining; N°s 29 and 105 on the elimination of forced or compulsory 
labour; N°s 138 and 182 on the effective abolition of child labour; and N°s 100 and 111 on the 
elimination of discrimination in employment and occupation. See International Labour 
Organization, International Labour Conference, ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work, Geneva, June 1998; International Labour Office, The International Labour 
Organization’s Fundamental Conventions, Geneva, 2002.  
8 The related international laws include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). International objectives refer to the goals 
highlighted in the UN Millennium Development Goals.  
9  International Labour Organization, Fundamental Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair 
Globalization, Geneva, 2008. 
10 European Union, “The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in the Lisbon 
Treaty in “Information and Notices”, Official Journal of the European Union, C83, vol. 53, 30 
March 2010, art. 5, 10, 11, 12, 15, 20, 21, 23, 24, 27- 32, 34. 
11 See for example, Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the 
Commission: the Social Dimension of Globalization - the EU's policy contribution on extending, 
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EU actions  
The EU promotes these norms towards China on bilateral and multilateral 
occasions such as the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM). Of the current three pillars 
in the EU-China ties,12 the bilateral political dialogue is a basic channel 
through which the EU diffuses the CLS and related norms.13 The framework of 
this dialogue comprises bilateral Summits, Human Rights Dialogue, sectoral 
cooperation and dialogues for closer policy co-ordination on issues including 
employment and social affairs. The EU also sponsors or co-sponsors various 
bilateral academic seminars on issues such as employment, working 
conditions and CSR.  
        Since 1995 the EU has issued a series of official papers to push and 
improve the dialogue.14 In these documents, it made increasing references to 
the international human rights norms including those from the ILO. The EU 
urged its supranational authorities and Member States to continue pressuring 
China to ratify and implement the CLS conventions while supporting China’s 
reform to follow those initiatives.15  
        EU officials generally raise these issues when making contact with 
Chinese authorities. For instance, the issue of forced labour in China, such as 
the system of ‘re-education through labour’ (RTL), was raised by EU 
representatives at the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue.16 In EU-China 
bilateral Summits, the CLS were often mentioned under the title of human 
rights. At these Summits, both sides pledged to respect these recognised 
                                                                                                                                            
COM (2004) 383 final, Brussels,18 May 2004; Commission of the European Communities, 
Communication from the Commission: Promoting decent work for all: the EU contribution to the 
implementation of the decent work agenda in the world, COM(2006) 249 final, Brussels, 24 May 
2006; Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission: 
Renewed social agenda: opportunities, access and solidarity in 21st century Europe, 
COM(2008) 412 final, Brussels, 2 July 2008; Commission of the European Communities, 
Communication from the Commission: a renewed EU Strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social 
Responsibility, COM(2011) 681, Brussels, 25 October 2011. 
12 The three pillars refer to political dialogue, trade and economic ties, and quite recently the 
people-to-people ties.  
13 The framework of the structured EU-China political dialogue was established in 1994 and 
gradually upgraded in 1998, 2002 and 2010.   
14 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission: a long 
term policy for China-Europe relations, COM (95)279 final; Commission of the European 
Communities, Communication from the Commission: building a comprehensive partnership 
with China, COM (98) 181 final, Brussels, 25 March1998; Commission of the European 
Communities, Communication from the Commission: EU Strategy towards China: 
Implementation of the 1998 Communication and Future Steps for a more Effective EU Policy,  
COM(2001) 265 final, 15 May 2001; Commission of the European Communities, Communication 
from the Commission: a maturing partnership - shared interests and challenges in EU-China 
relations, COM(2003)533 final, Brussels, 10 September 2003; Commission of the European 
Communities, Communication from the Commission: EU – China: Closer partners, growing 
responsibilities, COM(2006) 632 final, Brussels, 24 October 2006.   
15 Ibid. 
16 This system is also called "laodong jiaoyang" in China. See “EU and China Hold Human Rights 
Dialogue (01/06/2012)”, Delegation of the European Union to China, retrieved 10 September 
2012,   
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/china/press_corner/all_news/news/2012/20120601_en.htm.  
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international norms, at least rhetorically in the joint statements.17 The issues of 
decent work and CSR were also mentioned in the EU-China Summit of the 
year 2007.18 The concrete results of the EU-China political dialogue in this field 
include the Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) signed in 2005 and 2009 
respectively.19 The two MoUs led to a series of seminars, round table talks and 
cooperation projects covering employment, labour and social protection 
issues.    
          However, it is interesting to note that the joint statements of the recent 
four consecutive Summits (from 11th in 2009 to 14th in 2012) did not make 
mention of EU-China engagement in this field. One possible explanation for 
this is that, as bilateral cooperation in the field of health and safety at work 
had already been in operation, neither side needed to offer any further 
political push.20 Nevertheless, this interpretation cannot justify why these issues 
reappeared in the15th Summit.21   
         The development cooperation programmes and trade policy are other 
instruments that the EU employs.22 The EU once considered imposing import 
controls on goods in order to force China to take positive actions. For 
instance, in 2002 the European Parliament clearly signalled that products from 
forced labour camps in China should be rejected by the EU.23 It should be 
pointed out that, to date, the EU has not taken legal action to support its 
rhetorical objections to these products, in spite of years of internal discussions 
on this topic.24 
         In addition, the EU highlights the role of multilateral organisations in 
diffusing those norms. The ASEM is viewed by the EU as providing “a new 
dimension to the EU-China relationship”.25 Compared with the EU-China 
bilateral dialogue, the ASEM process seems to attach more importance to 
the social dimension of globalisation. Since 2006 the ASEM Summits have 
                                                 
17 The Joint Statement of the 4th EU-China Summit, Brussels, 5 September 2001; The Joint 
Statement of the 9th EU-China Summit, Helsinki, 9 September 2006, p 9. 
18 The Joint Statement of the 10th EU-China Summit, Beijing, 28 November 2007. 
19 The first is the Memorandum of Understanding on Labour, Employment and Social Affairs, 
signed by Commissioner Vladimir Špidla with the Chinese Minister of Labour and Social Security, 
Tian Chengping on 5 September 2005, at the EU-China Summit in Beijing. The MoU, signed in 
2009 by the Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities of the 
European Commission and the State Administration of Work Safety of the People’s Republic of 
China, was to set up a policy dialogue and cooperate in the field of health and safety at work. 
20 This view is based on the author’s interview with some EU officials in October 2012. The 
bilateral policy dialogue and cooperation in the field of health and safety at work was 
established according to the Memorandum of Understanding between the EU and China 
authorities signed in Brussels in January 2009.  
21 See The Joint Statement of the 15th EU-China Summit, Brussels, 20 September 2012, p 4. It 
stated that the EU and China “supported the promotion of the decent work agenda within the 
framework of ILO”.  
22 The EU sponsored numerous development projects to encourage China’s economic and 
social reform towards the rule of law and democracy. For more details, see the EU’s China 
policy papers mentioned above. 
23 European Parliament，EU strategy towards China, P5_TA (2002) 0719, Brussels, 2002,  Human 
rights section, point 37.  
24 A. Willis, “EU considers ban on Chinese labour-camp goods”, EUObserver, 23 September 
2010,  retrieved 10 December 2012, http://euobserver.com/china/30878.  
25 COM(98)181 final. 
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been paying an increasing amount of attention to this issue. The ASEM Labour 
and Employment Ministers’ Conference (LEMC) has already gathered four 
times to discuss it in more detail.26 Both summits and ministerial meetings make 
a clear reference to the ILO initiatives such as the CLS, the recommendations 
for decent work and CSR.27 Notably, while European representatives stressed 
the significance of these ILO initiatives, Chinese officials emphasised technical 
cooperation in order to create job opportunities.28 
The impact?  
It is difficult to evaluate the impact of the EU’s effort in norm diffusion to 
China, as other international actors like the ILO are also imposing varying 
pressure on China.29 Still, it is useful to analyse China’s mixed responses.30 On 
the one hand, China’s position on the freedom of expression and association 
remain unchanged.31 Recently, it downplayed the EU-China Human Rights 
Dialogue by reducing its frequency.32 Little visible achievement in this subfield 
makes EU officials disappointed and frustrated.33 Furthermore, the Chinese 
recently raised human rights issues in Europe in a more offensive manner than 
they did in 1990s when China was preoccupied with defending its stance in 
the UN.  
        On the other hand, China shows certain flexibility on the low sensitivity 
issues. China signed (in October 1997) and ratified (in March 2001) the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).34 It 
also took steps in abolishing child labour and eliminating discrimination in 
employment and occupation.35 The discussion of reforming its RTL system is 
                                                 
26 In Germany (2006), Indonesia (2008), the Netherlands (2010) and Vietnam (2012).  
27 See the in the Chairman's Statement of the 4th-8th ASEM Summits and the Chairman’s 
Conclusions of 1st-4rd ASEM LEMC.  
28 The Second ASEM LEMC Chairman’s Summary, Bali, Indonesia, 14-15 October 2008.  
29 The ILO has already established a relationship with China. In 2001 the ILO signed a MoU with 
China and in 2007 three parties in China signed the Decent Work Country Programme (2006-
2010). 
30 See Chinese government, China’s EU Policy Paper, 13 October 2003.   
31 To date China has not ratified the ILO Conventions N°s 87 and 98 on the rights to association 
and collective bargaining, and N°s 29 and 105 on the prohibition of forced labour. Nor has 
China ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). In the official 
documents of the bilateral and multilateral dialogues mentioned in this paper, there is no 
explicit language showing that China has changed its position.   
32 The EU was disappointed by the fact that “China had not agreed to a second session of the 
dialogue in 2010 and 2011”. See “EU and China Hold Human Rights Dialogue (01/06/2012)”, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/china/press_corner/all_news/news/2012/20120601_en.htm. 
33 This observation is based on the author’s interviews with some EU officers who are familiar 
with the dialogue with China on human rights. Also see “China: EU Rights Talks Sliding toward 
Irrelevance - Empty Rhetoric Betrays Lack of Strategy”, Human Rights Watch, May 25, 2012, 
retrieved 9 December 2012, http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/05/25/china-eu-rights-talks-sliding-
toward-irrelevance.  
34 China placed reservations, however, on the application of Article 8.1 (a) which is on freedom 
of association and trade union membership. See “Status of Treaties, Chapter IV”, Treaty 
Collection(databases), United Nations, retrieved 10 December 2012,  
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?chapter=4&lang=en&mtdsg_no=IV-
3&src=TREATY#EndDec.  
35 China ratified the ILO Conventions on child labour (N°s 138 in 1999 and N°s 182 in 2002) and 
elimination of discrimination at work (N°s 100 in 1990 and N°s 111 in 2005).   
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also ongoing. 36 By issuing its two human rights action plans and its first decent 
work country programme, China has recently been seeking to improve its 
image with regards to human rights.37 In addition, China shows much interest 
in the EU’s experience and technical assistance with issues relating to decent 
work, migrant workers’ rights and interests, social cohesion, social security and 
employment38.   
Tentative conclusion  
Based on the above examination of the three aspects of the EU efforts in 
promoting the social dimension of globalisation in China, a tentative 
conclusion is that the EU acts in a normative way only to a limited extent. The 
EU has been making efforts to diffuse those norms to China through ‘living by 
example’ in principles and ‘being reasonable’ in actions (dialogue and 
persuasion). However, its policy coherence and impact of norm diffusion are 
inevitably undermined by its limited leverage and determination in dealing 
with China. Meanwhile, its efforts are also challenged by China’s selective 
attitude to those norms. While the EU believes the universality of international 
norms, China takes a cautious and suspicious look at them and strongly 
defends its own traditional positions, particularly on highly sensitive issues. In a 
broader sense, interactions between the EU and China represent the lasting 
international debate about the nature of international norms: are they 
universal or relative? The current global power shift including the rise of China, 
the extending European debt crisis and the international economic recession, 
makes this debate more complicated than ever. All of the abovementioned 
issues pose great challenges for EU normative efforts. What proper role the EU 
can play in the future EU-China relationship and in global governance in 
general deserves deep contemplation.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36 J. FlorCruz, “Reforming China's Controversial Labor Camps ”, CNN, October 19, 2012, 
retrieved 17 December 2012,  http://edition.cnn.com/2012/10/18/world/asia/china-forced-
labor-camps/index.html.  
37 China, The Information Office of the State Council, National Human Rights Action Plan of 
China (2009-2010),Beijing, 2009; National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2012-2015), 
Beijing, 2012; China, contributing to realising decent work: ILO Decent Work Country 
Programme in the People’s Republic of China 2006 – 2010, 2007. 
38 See the joint statements of the 10th (2007) and 15th (2012) EU-China Summit. 
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SEMINAR ON “MASS COMMUNICATION AND EU-CHINA 
RELATIONS” 
 
 
On 18 December 2012 the InBev-Baillet Latour Chair of European Union-China 
Relations of the College of Europe, together with the Xinhua News Agency 
Europe Regional Bureau, and the Madariaga-College of Europe Foundation, 
organised a seminar on “Mass Communication and EU-China Relations” at 
the Madariaga-College of Europe Foundation in Brussels. The seminar 
gathered European and Chinese officials, journalists, scholars and 
representatives of civil society who engaged in a lively, thought-provoking 
and constructive discussion. Participants expressed their interest in the topic 
and their support to the organisers for more such events in the future.  
 The seminar on “Mass Communication and EU-China Relations” was 
introduced in the context of the tenth anniversary of the EU-China Strategic 
partnership and the efforts made to enhance people-to-people exchanges. 
The EU-China partnership has come a long way since 2003: the trade volume 
exchanged between the two parties has increased fourfold and the volume 
of investments is forty times larger than in 2003. The two partners are 
becoming more interdependent than they were ten years ago. On the one 
hand, China is able to provide the market that will enable Europe to recover 
from the economic crisis. On the other hand, as China is trying to boost 
innovation productivity and transform its production model, the EU is seen as 
one of its top partners. Participants stressed that issues of global scale cannot 
be solved without collaboration between the EU and China.  
The seminar was chaired by Prof. Jing Men, the InBev-Baillet Latour 
Chair of EU-China Relations at the College of Europe. Six speakers, three 
Europeans and three Chinese, discussed, in a warm and friendly atmosphere, 
a large array of issues relating to the development of mass communication 
and its impact on EU-China relations.  
Exchanges between the Chinese and European media 
One important issue addressed at the seminar was that mass communication 
needs to face the challenge presented by the speedy evolution of the 
financial markets and tackle the complexity of our globalised world. The 
media have to find a way to deal with the high velocity of decision-making. 
In order to ensure a break-through in a competitive world, most media and 
mass communication agencies focus on results. At a time when the Western 
media is suffering a tremendous crisis, Chinese media is thriving. European 
media should get used to different non-European perspectives, in order to be 
able to keep up the pace with the rapidly changing world.  
China’s soft power is growing very fast, but nonetheless China has an 
image of a hard power. Building trust in the relations with its partners is a true 
challenge. Against this backdrop, the presence of Chinese journalists in 
Brussels has rapidly increased from five in 2001 to 19 in 2006, and 43 today. 
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China pays more and more attention to European events. Chinese stories 
focus mostly on the Euro crisis, security and trade issues. The Chinese media 
have secured a very good follow-up of events and provide high-quality and 
consistent reporting. As part of their strategy, they employ foreign experts on 
European issues. The European counterparts to Chinese journalists confirmed 
that the work of the latter is excellent as they are proactive, accurate with 
quoting and quick in reaction.  
The impressive number of Chinese journalists in Brussels and other 
European capitals helps to project a more sophisticated picture of China. For 
example, the Chinese national news agency – Xinhua would like to become 
“one of the most important bridges between the EU and China”, while the 
China Daily newspaper has a mission to report “European-tailored China 
stories”.  
Xinhua News Agency, established in 1931, has 172 bureaus worldwide, 
33 in China alone, and releases stories in eight languages: Chinese, English, 
French, Spanish, Portuguese, Russian, Arabic and Japanese. Its regional 
bureau based in Brussels is responsible for coordinating 42 subordinate offices 
across Europe. Xinhua’s offices in Europe work in 25 different languages, and 
it actively competes with other major media groups in Europe. As was 
introduced at the seminar, Xinhua was the first foreign media agency to 
cover the tragic bus accident (in which a group of Belgian students were 
killed) in Switzerland that occurred in March 2012. The video shot on the spot 
was later projected by BBC. It was also the first to report the success of 
Hollande in his Presidential election in France, several seconds faster than the 
local French media. 
China Daily, founded thirty years ago, is also expanding its presence 
globally. It already has four offices in Europe and Africa, among which are 
London and Brussels. In order to establish itself in the global mass 
communication landscape, China Daily is practising co-branding with other 
global media. China Daily provides stories about political meetings and 
decisions taken in China, Chinese economic and social events and other 
stories of interest for the European public.  
In a highly competitive environment it is very important to find a niche 
of need for information targeted to a specific group. The German Press 
Agency, Deutsche Presse-Agentur (DPA), has created a special platform 
called “Insight EU”. This initiative aims at providing in-depth understanding of 
EU decisions by integrating analysis and approaches both from the EU level 
and the Member States level. Since the articles start by giving a general 
understanding of the adopted legislation and then go more into detail, they 
are suitable not only for the general public but also for decision-makers. 
Country image and perceptions 
 Three competing narratives on China seem to exist in the EU. Firstly, China’s 
status creates confusion as it fits neither in the category of developed 
countries (mostly OECD countries), nor in the category of developing 
countries. Secondly, China is admired for its great achievements in 
combating poverty and modernising the country. The EU sees China as a 
responsible power and recognises that it has challenges to face. Thirdly, there 
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is a general suspicion linked to a certain ‘communist stigma’. China’s 
unwillingness to be involved in human rights discussions and sanction 
measures against third parties together with the military assertiveness is 
perceived as a threat to peace. 
Although China is often portrayed as being a communist country with 
a strong economy and a regime which is opposed to democracy, from a 
Chinese perspective, China is not a communist country. Currently, it is at the 
preliminary stage of socialism. In other words, the Chinese government has 
the important task of improving the economic productivity and living 
conditions of the whole society. Even though China’s GDP is growing quite 
quickly, as the second largest economy in the world, the country is facing big 
imbalances. The richest 10 percent of the population earn 60 times more than 
the poorest 10 percent. China strives to reduce production costs and energy 
consumption and improve efficiency. It is also important to note that China 
and Chinese leaders are not, in principle, opposed to democracy because it 
is seen as a means to achieving a decent life. This being said, participants 
clarified that democracy, as it is understood in the West (i.e. closely linked to 
the separation of power vertically, horizontally and the balance between 
political and civil forces), is unlikely to be implemented in China since the 
Chinese reality is different. China is, however, constantly changing and 
Chinese leaders are becoming more liberal and down-to-earth. It is very likely 
that the new generation of Chinese growing up now will become a driving 
force for even bigger and faster reforms. 
Lack of mutual trust in EU-China relations 
From a Chinese perspective, the European media working on the topic of 
China is both provocative and visionary. However, even though think-tanks 
have greatly contributed to the development of EU-China relations, much 
more has yet to be done.  
Despite the increased presence of Chinese journalists, perceptions of 
China and the Chinese media are often marked by unclear relations 
between the Chinese government and Chinese policy-makers and Chinese 
media. Moreover, EU-China relations, as often pointed out by officials from 
both sides, are undermined by an overall lack of mutual trust, which 
resurfaces in diverse trade-related disputes such as the Huawei issue or the 
solar panel issue.  
The lack of trust is enhanced by misunderstandings concerning media 
ownership and freedom of expression in China. These issues, coupled with the 
lack of transparency and understanding of the Chinese and European 
decision-making processes, lead to the fundamental problem of the lack of 
trust. Participants argued that a more open approach toward foreign media, 
in particular when it comes to press conferences after major events on EU-
China relations, will be rather beneficial for China. This can be an opportunity 
to explain the Chinese stance to the European public and thus avoid country-
labelling and, to a certain extent, help reshape the image of China. In the 
same line, it was suggested that China pays more attention to the large 
variety of media and to the necessity to treat all media in an equal manner. 
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Conclusion  
Despite the fact that huge differences exist between the EU and China, 
speakers at the seminar all agreed that they share many common challenges 
and they need each other. In a globalised world and one which experiences 
a rapid development of informatisation, media communication plays an 
important role in bringing information to people, increasing either mutual 
understanding or misunderstanding between different societies. In the field of 
EU-China relations, it is necessary to pay due attention to the role of the 
media, and a greater number of seminars and conferences should be 
organised to address such an issue. 
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CALL FOR PAPERS 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 
EU-CHINA SOFT DIPLOMACY 
Thursday & Friday, 18-19 April 2013, Brussels 
 
  
The Inbev-Baillet Latour Chair of European Union-China Relations at the 
College of Europe invites experts to contribute papers which focus on EU-
China soft diplomacy. The papers will be presented at the International 
Conference on 18-19 April 2013 at the EU Committee of the Regions, 99-101 
Rue Belliard, 1040 Brussels.  
 
Deadline for submission of paper proposals: 15 January 2013 (extended to 31 
January 2013) 
Context 
In a globalised world where a variety of state and non-state actors are 
involved in the art and practice of conducting negotiations, the classical 
definition of diplomacy is insufficient to encompass the existing interactions. 
Culture plays a crucial role in the relations between nations and in the 
definition of identities. Increasingly, foreign relations on both bilateral and 
multilateral levels are driven by public diplomacy, cultural and environmental 
cooperation. This is why ‘soft diplomacy’, a new angle of examining 
diplomacy, which involves new and non-governmental actors, becomes 
more and more relevant to bridge the gap between different cultures.  
The relationship between two of the most prominent world actors - the 
European Union (EU) and China - is no exception to this trend. Enhancing trust 
and mutual understanding by promoting people-to-people exchanges 
between the EU and China have thus become the leitmotif for policy-makers 
on both sides. In this regard, 2012 was a landmark year for EU-China relations 
as it saw the establishment of the third pillar of the EU-China strategic 
partnership – the High Level People-to-People Dialogue.  
The aim of this two-day international conference is to foster research 
on different topics related to EU-China soft diplomacy. It will bring together 
European and Chinese policy practitioners, scholars, representatives of NGOs 
and of the business community, to examine the role and impact of soft 
diplomacy on the bilateral interaction between the EU and China. The 
conference will offer the opportunity for debate on a large array of issues of 
common interest in a spirit of enhanced people-to-people contacts.  
The working language of the conference is English. Selected papers will 
be edited and published either in a special issue of an international 
academic journal or in a book with an international publisher. 
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Proposed topics 
The InBev Baillet-Latour Chair of EU-China Relations would like to solicit experts 
to contribute papers on soft diplomacy in the context of EU-China relations. 
Contributions should cover one or more of the following dimensions of EU-
China relations: 
 Public diplomacy and communication 
 Cultural diplomacy 
 Environmental (and climate change) diplomacy 
 Educational Diplomacy 
Participation in the conference is free of charge and meals during the 
conference will be provided. 
Submission of proposals 
Please submit paper proposals of approximately 500 words along with a brief 
CV to both Professor Jing Men (jing.men@coleurope.eu) and Veronika 
Orbetsova (veronika.orbetsova@coleurope.eu) no later than 15 January 2013 
(extended to 31 January 2013). All proposals will be reviewed and the 
organisers will confirm acceptance by 5 February 2012. Participants are 
expected to provide complete copies of their papers, which should be 
around 7,000 words, in electronic form by 30 March 2013.  
Contact 
InBev-Baillet Latour Chair of European Union-China Relations 
EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies 
College of Europe, Dijver 11 
BE-8000 Bruges, Belgium 
Fax: +32-50-477250 
Tel. +32-50-477.258 / 257 
jing.men@coleurope.eu 
veronika.orbetsova@coleurope.eu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
